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This paper is an enquiry into the unpredictability of the liberally educated 
mind. We are all familiar with the value placed on the word critical when it 
figures prominently in justifications for liberal arts pedagogy, as in “a liberal 
arts education should foster the capacity for critical thinking.” However, de-
pending on the milieu in which “critical thinking” is habituated, the mean-
ing of the term may degrade into a theoretical conformity and passive assent 
to established routines which are inevitably expressions of disapproval. This 
trajectory is described as disenchantment. Its origins are traced to represen-
tations of the intellectual as a distinctly secular creature and, in contempo-
rary philosophical developments, associated with political liberalism—both 
of which, it is argued, are dominated by fear. Drawing on the recent Catholic 
“Communio” theology of David Schindler as a way to unveil the repressed 
theologies and hidden ontologies of liberal neutrality, the paper concludes 
with a brief examination of liberal arts scholarship that is increasingly open 
to various models of enchantment.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article se veut une interrogation quant à l’imprévisibilité de l’esprit ayant 
reçu une formation en arts libéraux. Nous connaissons tous la valeur accordée 
au terme critique lorsqu’il apparaît de manière saillante dans des justifications 
pour la pédagogie des arts libéraux, comme dans l’affirmation suivante : « Une 
formation en arts libéraux doit nourrir la pensée critique. » Toutefois, selon 
le milieu auquel la « pensée critique » s’est accoutumée, la signification du 
terme peut se dégrader en une conformité théorique  et en un consentement 
passif envers les routines établies, qui sont inévitablement des expressions 
de désapprobation. On décrit cette trajectoire par le terme désenchantement. 
On retrace ses origines aux représentations de l’intellectuel en une créature 
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distinctement séculaire et, avec les progrès de la philosophie contemporaine, 
on l’associe aujourd’hui au libéralisme politique, certains affirmant que tous 
deux sont dominés par la peur. Décrivant la récente théologie catholique du 
« communio » de David Schindler comme une façon de dévoiler les théologies 
refoulées et les ontologies dissimulées de la neutralité libérale, l’auteur conclut 
en examinant brièvement les bourses remises en arts libéraux, de plus en plus 
ouvertes aux différents modèles d’enchantement.
In December 2005, the Council of Ontario Universities formally endorsed “Guidelines 
for University Undergraduate Degree Level Expectations,” a document in which the word 
critical appears six times—as a modifier, adjective, or adverb—and each time indicating 
the capacity for discernment and the analytical evaluation of something (Ontario Coun-
cil of Academic Vice-Presidents, 2005). I argue that, depending on the milieu in which 
critical thinking is habituated, its meaning degrades into a theoretical conformity and 
passive assent to established routines which are inevitably expressions of disapproval. I 
describe this trajectory as disenchantment within liberal arts teaching and learning, and 
what follows is intended to trace this tendency to its roots in representations of the intel-
lectual as a distinctly secular creature, and in contemporary philosophical developments 
associated with political liberalism, both of which I claim are dominated by fear. I draw 
on recent Catholic Communio thought as a way to unveil the repressed theologies and 
hidden ontologies of liberal neutrality, and I conclude with a brief examination of liberal 
arts scholarship that is increasingly open to various models of enchantment. Above all, I 
am trying to find ways of conceiving of the experience of teaching and learning as desir-
able enchantment, and of celebrating the unpredictability of the liberally educated mind. 
PART 1
“No creature can learn that which his heart has no shape to hold,” (McCarthy, 1992, 
p. 111) says the novelist Cormac McCarthy, reminding us that learning is a process of 
character. The symmetry at work—the idea that what you know depends on who you are—
means that becoming a member of a community of practice like a university involves de-
veloping a new, social self. There is reciprocity here, however, and the social identity un-
der development shapes what one comes to know, and how we assimilate knowledge and 
information. Jerome Bruner makes the distinction between learning about and learning 
to be. But even when we learn about, in Bruner’s terms, the identity we are developing 
determines what we pay attention to and what we learn (Brown & Duguid, 2000).
By third or fourth year, some undergraduates in the liberal arts will feel sufficiently sea-
soned and confident enough in their identities as new scholars to submit their work to an 
essay contest. At Trent University, where I work, students submit work to a contest named 
in honour of the founding president, Professor Tom Symons. Here is an excerpt from a 
letter from one of the contest judges to colleagues in the Department of Canadian Studies: 
My experience of reading the undergraduate essays submitted last spring for Sy-
mons Prizes in Canadian Studies was exhilarating and at the same time disquiet-
ing. It is a joy to see how talented and intelligent and thoughtful and articulate our 
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best students are. But if these are indeed the best papers, they are similar in a way 
that causes me concern. They come from a wide range of disciplines and instruc-
tors, but what struck me was how common, almost universal, is our approval of 
negativity. It seems clear from them that we as instructors must be validating and 
even valorizing the discourse of grievance, objection and complaint. I think we 
must actively or unconsciously be encouraging suspicion and antipathy in our stu-
dents. We seem to have led them to believe that being conscious means objecting 
to something, as if we were stuck at the stage of antithetical thought. (Johnston, 
personal communication, 2004)
Injustices and failures are all around us, and we must confront and engage them, cor-
rect them, and encourage students to do so as well. But how has critical thinking become 
synonymous with expressing disapproval? How have learners been brought to associate 
admiration with naïveté or treason (Johnston, personal communication, 2004)? It seems 
as though the disenchanting aspects of the milieu in which new students develop their new 
social identities effectively override whatever affirmative discourses of devotion, honour, 
praise, and joy they may have imported when they were admitted. In Bottom’s words to 
Titania, “Reason and love keep little company together now-a-days; the more the pity that 
some honest neighbours will not make them friends” (Shakespeare, 1993, Act 3, Scene 1).
Elaine Marks, first chair of the Women’s Studies Research Center and chair of Wom-
en’s Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, relates a teaching experience in 
which both her choice of certain texts and the manner of reading them were contested 
by students. The text was Dust Tracks on a Road by Zora Neal Hurston, assigned in a 
women’s studies course called Writing Women’s Li(v)es. What disturbed members of the 
all-female class (especially the white students) was that Hurston’s story did not narrate 
the unrelieved oppression of a black woman growing up in the American south in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries:
These angry students did not react with “surprise” at the discrepancy between their 
expectations and the words of the text but rather with hostility, in part because, 
through no fault of their own, they have had little or no training in the reading of a 
literary text. Like most readers, they tend to read uniquely for information, for his-
torical or psychological “realism.” Although the first text we had read together in 
that course was Nelly Furman’s superb 1980 essay “Textual Feminism,” which in-
sists on the importance of words, language, and the signifier and attempts to show 
that literature has functions other than the referential, their habits of reading were 
not easily challenged. Indeed, these habits are often supported by ideological posi-
tions that students, in some of their classes, are taught to look for in all the texts 
they read. If the students do not find evidence of racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism, 
they tend to assume that either the writer or the teacher is guilty of a cover-up. 
(2005, p. 422–423)
The problem is particularly acute in the liberal arts and social sciences where “ag-
gressive vocabularies of subversion, demystification, transgression, violence, fissure, de-
centered subjects, fragmentation, and dismantling master narratives” are generating a 
“pervasive mindset” determined to wage a predictably anti-establishment ideological po-
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litical struggle (Patai & Corral, 2005). This approach invariably ends at the same point: 
“A denunciation of authors for their limitations vis-à-vis the orthodoxies of the historical 
moment and its preferred ‘voices,’ or alternatively, a celebration of authors or texts for 
expressing the favoured politics or for merely embodying the requisite identity” (Patai & 
Corral, 2005).
Behind all this ordained transgression is an image of what academic labour in the lib-
eral arts entails:
Contemporary academics see themselves as having merely four brief years in which 
to demystify students, and somehow to get them to look up... long enough to gaze 
upon the darker side of American and Western life.... How can they make them 
understand, with only four years to do so, that capitalism and individualism have 
created cultures that are cruel, inefficient, racist, sexist, and homophobic, with op-
pressive caste systems, mental and behavioral? How, in such a brief period, can 
they enlighten “minorities,” including women (the majority of students), about the 
“internalization” of their oppression (today’s equivalent of false consciousness)? 
How, in only eight semesters, might they use the classroom, curriculum, and uni-
versity in loco parentis to create a radical leadership among what they see as the 
victim groups of our society? (Kors, 2008, para. 10)
Imagine if universities actually published a clear statement of their intention to re-
form, setting down on page one of their academic calendars and fundraising letters:
This University believes that your sons and daughters are the racist, sexist, ho-
mophobic, Eurocentric progeny or victims of an oppressive society from which 
most of them received unjust privilege. In return for tuition and massive taxpayer 
subsidy, we shall assign rights on a compensatory basis and undertake by coercion 
their moral and political enlightenment. (Kors, 2008, para. 13)
Now, there are limits to parents’ readiness to know, and this kind of calendar copy 
is “too much information.” It will never see the light of day in university view-books, 
because if it did, the taxpayers involved would be very unhappy. It is more acceptable to 
say, with Edward Said (1994), that “the purpose of the intellectual’s activity is to advance 
human freedom and knowledge” (p. 17). And yet, as literary exemplars Said offers the 
provocative figures of Bazarov from Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, and Stephen Dedalus 
from Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Bazarov’s is a deeply confrontational 
intellect, “not fit for domestication,” and precisely because Dedalus is an intellectual, he 
“will not adjust to domesticity or to humdrum routine” (p. 17). So much for the trenches of 
day-to-day existence that make up much of adult life, and generate the income that goes 
to pay tuition.
According to a recent essay in Harper’s Magazine, we should nurture and protect the 
liberal arts: 
Why? Because they complicate our vision, pull our most cherished notions out by 
the roots, flay our pieties. Because they grow uncertainty. Because they expand the 
reach of our understanding (and therefore our compassion), even as they force us 
to draw and redraw the borders of tolerance. Because out of all this work of self-
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building might emerge an individual capable of humility in the face of complexity; 
an individual formed through questioning and therefore not likely to cede that 
right; an individual resistant to coercion, to manipulation and demagoguery in all 
their forms. (Slouka, 2009, p. 37)
We can hear in this statement the familiar justification for liberal arts education as the 
incubator of democratic citizenship. The point about flayed pieties should give us pause, 
however, as the following joke, told by David Foster Wallace in his 2005 commencement 
speech at Kenyon College, attempts to show:
There are these two guys sitting together in a bar in the remote Alaskan wilderness. 
One of the guys is religious, the other is an atheist, and the two are arguing about 
the existence of God with that special intensity that comes after about the fourth 
beer. And the atheist says: “Look, it’s not like I don’t have actual reasons for not 
believing in God. It’s not like I haven’t ever experimented with the whole God and 
prayer thing. Just last month I got caught away from the camp in that terrible bliz-
zard, and I was totally lost and I couldn’t see a thing, and it was 50 below, and so I 
tried it: I fell to my knees in the snow and cried out ‘Oh, God, if there is a God, I’m 
lost in this blizzard, and I’m gonna die if you don’t help me.’” And now, in the bar, 
the religious guy looks at the atheist all puzzled. “Well then you must believe now,” 
he says. “After all, here you are, alive.” The atheist just rolls his eyes. “No, man, all 
that was was a couple Eskimos happened to come wandering by and showed me 
the way back to camp.” (2008, para. 4)
The atheism in this story is an illiberal dismissal of the possibility that the passing 
Inuit had anything to do with a prayer for help. Indeed, a truly critical thinker would re-
ject “blind certainty,” even in its atheistic mode, as “a close-mindedness that amounts to 
an imprisonment so total that the prisoner doesn’t even know he’s locked up” (Wallace, 
2008, para. 5).
How, in the liberally educated mind, has the experience of faith, reverence, or devo-
tion come to be associated with blind conformity and unreflective adherence to old ways? 
The answer, for Said (1994), is that the life of the mind is intrinsically non-theological: 
“The true intellectual is a secular being” (p. 89). Said is well known as an advocate of the 
form of secularism that condemns religion while also relegating it to the private sphere. 
For Said, “In the secular world—our world, the historical and social world made by hu-
man effort—the intellectual has only secular means to work with; revelation and inspira-
tion, while perfectly feasible as modes of understanding in private life, are disasters and 
even barbaric when put to use by theoretically minded men and women. Indeed, I would 
go so far as saying that the intellectual must be involved in a lifelong dispute with all the 
guardians of sacred vision or text, whose depredations are legion and whose heavy hand 
brooks no disagreement and certainly no diversity” (p. 65). But there is a back story to 
Said’s definition of intellectual activity in terms of secular criticism, the theme of which is 
political salvation and rescue from religious violence. 
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PART 2
The politically neutral “state,” a centralized power holding a monopoly on violence 
within a defined territory, first appeared during the anarchy that convulsed Western Eu-
rope throughout the 16th and 17th centuries (Weber, 1946). We are all familiar with the 
“wars of religion” and the historical narrative of how the modern state saved us from our 
religious selves. The liberal democratic state delivers us “from the bloodshed and brutal-
ity of religious disagreement” (Bell, 2007, p. 426). In the wake of the Reformation, as 
theological passion blended with political power, wars ensued and liberalism was born 
out of religious cruelty.
Anxieties about violence in the relations between the religions are widely shared. If 
Christians can treat each other so abominably, what hope is there for believers of different 
faiths, especially today? No surprise, then, that all the quality press in the academic study 
of religion and theology assumes that “religion is a prime (often the prime) source of vio-
lence, and the modern state and market the great bringer of peace” (Milbank, Pickstock, 
& Ward, 1999, p. 14). 
This state salvation story is rooted in modern liberal political philosophy and its cou-
rageous search for a core morality on which people with different theological reasons for 
living can agree. Many theorists locate their courage in terms of a thoroughly detached 
relation to inherited and community-based forms of felt conviction and religious cultural 
traditions. This line of argument calls for a philosophy of individualism in support of the 
principle of neutrality: the idea that the state should not promote one controversial view 
of the good life at the expense of others. Liberalism should be conceived as a strictly politi-
cal doctrine, as distinguished from a general philosophy of humanity or a comprehensive 
moral doctrine. Liberal political structures, it is argued, are not the same as liberal political 
theory or ideology, and this distinction provides a justification for neutrality “without hav-
ing to take sides in the dispute about individualism and tradition” (Larmore, 1996, p. 132).
In this view, the norms of political liberalism, especially equal respect and rational 
dialogue, are ranked higher than theologically-based anthropologies, and any doubt of 
the character of this move elicits a dire warning: To make of liberal neutrality yet another 
controversial and partisan vision of the good life is to disable it, and either modern experi-
ence dissolves in the light of “the one irresistible, all-encompassing Good,” or our political 
future will be one “where ignorant armies clash by night” (p. 151). As modern experience 
is not likely to dissolve into beneficent universalism, there comes into view from Matthew 
Arnold’s “Dover Beach” a fearful nightmare vision from which all educators, secular and 
religious, liberal or conservative, should like to awake.
Instead of trembling at this prospect, however, recent critics such as David L. Schindler 
and Luke Bretherton have drawn attention to how arguments for neutrality like this one 
furnished by political liberalism actually draw everyone into a con game. In the (puta-
tively) neutral and open market of religious worldviews, we must also accept terms that 
are (hiddenly) filled out with a liberal theory of religion—a theory, by the way, that liberal 
theory claims not to have. The argument here is that the appeal to liberal neutrality, as 
regards competing visions of the good life, hides its own truth about the nature of reli-
gion. If the critics are right, then we are looking at a deceit that should be unacceptable, 
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regardless of one’s convictions about a transcendent order, because no matter what those 
convictions are, they are viewed with complete indifference by this neutral party, politi-
cal liberalism. As one commentator has recently noted, what appears tolerant because 
it values all differences isn’t tolerant at all because it refuses to engage with differences, 
judging all particularity as of equal value or as essentially the same (Bretherton, 2008).
While the refusal to engage appears at first as a strategic advance onto neutral com-
mon ground because it is supposed to maintain the peace when reasonable people dis-
agree about religion, it turns out to be finesse. The empty character of neutrality actually 
prepares the ground for the delivery of a liberal anthropology (Schindler, 1996). If we 
slow liberal theory down, we see that it imports—frame by frame—both metaphysics and 
theology, which on the surface it claims not to do. This way of defending liberal neutrality 
soon collapses into a hidden atheistic dogmatism that cannot conceive of prayers being 
answered.
First of all, it is impossible to distinguish the formal constitutional structures (like a 
neutral forum of rational dialogue and equal respect, protected by the state) from liberal 
theory as such unless we define religious freedom primarily in negative terms—as a pro-
tection from the coercion to confess only one set of convictions. But what if religious free-
dom, when defined in negative terms (as freedom from), “already presupposes a theory of 
religion different from one which would define religious freedom first in positive terms, in 
terms of the person’s positive relation toward God” (Schindler, 1996, p. 50)? While liberal 
neutrality may claim or intend a positive sense of openness to the transcendent, it is in 
fact a comprehensive silence about God, gods, and the transcendent order. This silence, 
“is not yet, in and of itself, an indication of positive openness to God” (p. 63, emphasis in 
original), and it is not possible to have it both ways. You cannot embrace a formal defini-
tion of political neutrality (freedom from), while implying a positive openness to the idea 
of God (freedom for). To insist that freedom from carries a logical implication of freedom 
for is to abandon the claim of political neutrality.
Thus political liberalism already serves to dispose society logically toward an “indif-
ferent” human nature and to mute all talk of a nature positively oriented toward God 
(Schindler, 1996). Here is one of the more influential pictures of that indifference:
How recognizable, how familiar to us, is the man... who confronted even with Christ 
turns away to consider the judgment of his own conscience and to hear the voice 
of his own reason. Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background... this man 
is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave, 
the hero of so many novels and books of moral philosophy.... He is the offspring of 
the age of science, confidently rational and yet increasingly aware of his alienation 
from the material universe which his discoveries reveal. (Murdoch, 1986, p. 80)
The “non-confessional state” as envisioned by political liberalism finds its correla-
tion in precisely this anthropology: “rational, responsible, brave” (Schindler, 1996, p. 83), 
and—in the end—unable to avoid affirming a priority of freedom from faith or freedom 
for faith. In its moment of weakness, the neutrality of political liberalism tilts toward 
the negative (freedom from) and transforms what religious people take to be self-evident 
meaning their convictions. A comprehensive vision of the good becomes modular; in oth-
er words, a fungible appendix that is bolted onto human nature: 
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The non-triviality of this maneuver becomes especially clear when we note its impli-
cations with respect to any non-Western (or nonliberalized) religion—with respect 
to any country where a traditional (or non-dualistic) worldview still predominates. 
In countries, for example, where certain forms of Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, Na-
tive American-Indian, or African religion still prevail, an invitation to adopt the 
juridical notion of religious freedom (freedom from) amounts to nothing less than 
an invitation to adopt the theological dualism of liberalism in the name of a purely 
formal commitment to the principle of freedom. (Schindler, 1996, p. 66–67)
That which guarantees the required neutrality turns out to be a theoretical dualism 
that reorients identity. In the end, critics argue that political liberalism distorts “the reli-
giousness of religions” (McIntire, 2007, p. 11). It does not leave traditional religion intact, 
but instead requires its realignment in terms acceptable to the dualism of church and 
state (Schindler, 1996). The significance of this point becomes clear when we recall Said’s 
notion of religion as a fundamentally private disposition of the individual. According to 
political liberalism, the human act, in its basic structure, is understood for the purposes 
of the public realm to be silent toward, or devoid of any meaningful connection to, God:
But this means that, when religious people go on to fill this silence with speech, 
they must do so precisely by way of addition and in their capacity as private mem-
bers of society. Non-theists, in contrast, have merely to leave the state’s formally 
conceived human act as it is, namely in the emptiness which has already been ac-
corded official-public status. (Schindler, 1996, p. 69, emphasis in original)
Believers may balk at the demands for public atheism and atheists may find them-
selves with unwarranted theoretical privileges in modern liberal democracies, their pub-
lic spheres, and their institutions of higher learning, but remember, according to Larmore 
(1996, p. 151), the consequences if we take liberalism to be only one more partisan ideal: 
Our future will be one “where ignorant armies clash by night.” 
PART 3
In Max Weber’s widely acclaimed discussion of the term, disenchantment describes a 
world that has lost some of its allure and now seems lifeless in certain ways. But Weber 
was not nostalgic for the old world. He thought the process was inevitable and on the 
whole beneficial (Sherry, 2009, p. 369–370). To the extent that it is a loss, disenchant-
ment is the desirable loss of error, superstition, and illusion (a disarming of ignorant 
armies), but as a paradigm for liberal arts, education and vocation of the intellectual dis-
enchantment is or ought to be disintegrating. I hope I have been able to show how that 
might be brought about from the perspective of political theology, but scholars outside 
of that discipline increasingly share and promote the criticisms that reveal how the mod-
ernist secular template is anything but neutral and blank (McIntire, 2007). Some, for ex-
ample, have argued that the binary approach to modernity and enchantment (where they 
are mutually exclusive categories) obscures tensions and contradictions intrinsic to the 
modern world: “The seeming ‘universal’ distinctions championed by the Western metro-
pole between modernity and tradition, or secularism and superstition, often do not hold 
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up... when viewed from the ‘periphery’ of non-Western cultures negotiating processes of 
modernization in complex ways” (Landy & Saler, 2009, p. 6). In addition, teachers are 
increasingly appreciative of their own roles in the construction of knowledge of religion 
and willing to clarify how their own lived relationship with religion conditions their study 
of religion (McIntire, 2007).
Looking farther afield, we encounter recent evidence that the problems of modernity 
and enchantment are eliciting responses that explore their compatibility. According to 
this view, the contemporary world retains the power to enchant humans, and we can 
cultivate ourselves so as to experience more of its effects: “Enchantment is something 
that we encounter, that hits us, but it is also a comportment that can be fostered through 
deliberate strategies” (Bennett, 2001, p. 4). We can, in other words, put ourselves in the 
way of enchantment. As an example of one of these strategies the spectacle of modern 
sports events. 
At a Stanford University colloquium in 1995, Pablo Morales, a three-time Olympic 
gold medallist in swimming, was quoted by Gumbrecht (2009) as saying it was the ad-
dictive qualities of “being lost in focused intensity” (p. 150) that had lured him out of re-
tirement and back into competition. To some theorists, this view suggests that sport can 
become, for athletes and spectators, a strategy for re-enchantment. “Being lost” points 
metaphorically to the sacred, “as a realm whose fascination relies on being set apart from 
everyday worlds” (p. 150). “Being lost” refers to the distance and isolation an athlete feels 
during competition, so much so that from the perspective of mundane everyday life, ath-
letic events are extra-ordinary. Second, what athletes and spectators focus on and follow 
in a game or competition belongs to the “realm of epiphanies” (p. 150). Athletic epipha-
nies reveal the body in motion and show moving bodies as “temporalized form.” The well-
turned double play in baseball, for example, has in this reading a miraculously balletic 
quality, full of grace, strength, and timing. A beautiful play in football “is an epiphany of 
form because it has its substance in the participating athletes’ bodies; because the form 
it produces is unlikely and thereby an event, achieved against the resistance against the 
other team’s defense; and finally and above all the beautiful play is an epiphany because 
it is a temporalized form, a form that begins to vanish in the very process of emergence” 
(p. 153). Third, whenever hockey goalies or tennis players talk of “being in the zone,” we 
might see “halos of intensity.” A player must be physically and mentally conditioned for 
this state to occur, but conditioning alone is not enough: “What else needs to happen for a 
player to be in the zone will depend, as we would say today, on whether he is ‘on,’ whether 
a specific game is ‘his’ or not—it will depend on what the Greeks would have called divine 
inspiration” (Gumbrecht, 2009, p. 152–153). Finally, there is the obvious comparison of 
stadiums to sacred spaces and their irresistible appeal for sports fans:
Above all, stadiums as sacred spaces are spaces that require and trigger layers of 
ritualized behaviour during those comparatively short moments in which they are 
filled with action. Being in a stadium, both for athletes and spectators, is not pri-
marily about inventing and showing individualized action. It is about inscribing 
oneself, physically, into a pre-existing order that only allows for narrow spaces of 
variation. Every event, every country, every moment in the history of sport devel-
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ops its own rituals, poses, and gestures that open up a dimension for endless indi-
vidual interpretation. (Gumbrecht, 2009, p. 155)
Spectators, too, feel something special when they enter a soccer stadium shortly before 
kickoff: They see and are immediately attracted to the empty space, and they wait in antici-
pation for the players to enter from the tunnels. Then, “it is through the utterly unsurpris-
ing and yet explosively exciting moment when the teams take the field that the spectators 
are conjured into their communal identity and agency” (Gumbrecht, 2009, p. 155).
CONCLUSION
This analysis takes us to the gratitude many sports fans feel toward their most admired 
heroes. I admire third baseman David Wright of the New York Mets, but chances are I will 
never have an opportunity to express my admiration to him personally or in conversation. 
So, in an age where the traditional religious horizons appear to have receded out of sight, 
my gratitude gets deflected toward the world that we have:
Gratitude for great athletic moments turns into gratitude for those things that 
we approve of, like, enjoy, and appreciate in our everyday lives. Being thankful 
for what we have does not necessarily make us “uncritical” and “affirmative.” Al-
though this exactly must be a fear that explains why so many intellectuals—even 
some intellectuals who love to watch or to practice sport—have such a hard time 
making peace with it. (Gumbrecht, 2009, p. 158)
The academic world in which we live and work is steeped in the tradition of sic et non, 
of a dialectic originating in Aristotelian logic, of debating clubs in which you are only 
able to say something by confronting the opposition, and by taking an adversarial stance 
(Johnston, personal communication, 2004). It is indeed remarkable how ferocious the 
competitive instinct can be in all quarters of academia. What I have argued here is that 
non is swamping sic these days, that the problem at its core involves representations of 
the intellectual in liberal democracy as a figure dominated by fear, and that the negative 
discourse is inordinately consuming us. 
Here is one of the many ways allusions to our times as the “age of anxiety” (Auden, 
2011) seem to hit home. In a recent essay, continental philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2005) 
suggests that what causes anxiety is the transformation of transgression into the norm: 
“Since, even before we can assert our singularity through our resistance to the norm, the 
norm in advance enjoins us to resist, to violate, to go further and further” (p. 69). Inher-
ited reverences as norms governing personal and social interactions no longer function 
as they once did; the reality is they no longer serve anyone as warnings or paradigms. 
Instead, they facilitate transgressive behaviours:
These regulations no longer function as the symbolic prohibition—they rather reg-
ulate modes of transgression themselves. So when the ruling ideology enjoins us 
to enjoy sex, not to feel guilty about it, since we are not bound by any prohibitions 
whose violations should make us feel guilty, the price we pay for this absence of 
guilt is anxiety. (Žižek, 2005, p. 69)
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Here, then, is the intimation of deprival as far as teaching and learning goes. If, even be-
fore they can assert a singularity through resistance to norms and reverences, learners are 
encouraged in advance to resist, to violate, to go further and further, then we suck the air 
out of the “breathing space” provided by reverences and prohibitions (Žižek, 2005, p. 69). 
To deny learners the experience of limits that allow for safe return from risky behaviours 
that are not yet fully transgressive (that is, breathing space), and instead to furnish only op-
portunities for them to flay their own and others’ pieties directly, is suffocating. It says not 
only that we teach from a position of fear, but that we offer existential anxiety as proof of 
success. In the liberal arts, it is difficult to conceive of a more egregious disservice. 
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